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SAMUEL MORSE AND WIFE v. TOWN OF RICHMOND.'
Towns owe a statutory duty to travellers, for the breach of which the party
injured may maintain an action, to remove from the margins of their highways
objects unlawfully deposited there, which, by their frightful appearance, make it
unsafe to travel the road with ordinary hc;:es.
The duty of the town to remove the obstruction from the highway does not
attach until they know of it, or ought to know of it, nor while it is upon the highway a reasonable time for the purposes of transportation over it.
Though a town is not bound to work the whole width of the road where the
travel does not require it, yet they have a right to control the whole width and
have a corresponding duty. If they suffir objects to remain deposited on the margin which, by their frightful appearance, make the whole road unsafe, they will be
liable for such accidents by fright as are the natural result of their neglect.
Towns are held to a higher responsibility with reference to removing deposits
of private property which are placed on the road without right and obstruct public
travel by their frightful appearance, than with reference to removing equally dangerous objects which either ore incident to the nature of the soil and country or
are thrown upon the margin in process of constructing the road.
The defendants excepted to the ruling of the court that if the bales of hay
deposited without right by a railway company upon the margin of the defendants'
highway presented such an appearance that they might reasonably be expected to
and naturally would frighten ordinary horses, and the plaintiff's injury occurred
by such flight, the defendant town would be liable, the plaintiff's. case in all other
respects being first made out, although the surface and width of the travelled path
were faultless. Held, that there was no error.
Distinction between highway laws of Vermont and Massachusetts.

THIs was an action of trespass on the case for injuries alleged
to have been sustained by the plaintiff's wife, by reason of defects
and insufficiencies in a certain highway in said town of Richmond,
which the defendants were bound to repair.
On trial the plaintiff proved that on June 15th, 1864, a freight
tran, about 7 or 8 o'clock in the morning, came. up on the Vermont Central Railroad, and one of the cars loaded with bales of
hay was on fire; that to extinguish said fire the railroad employees
unloaded said hay on the depot grounds, and scattered some bales
over the depot grounds, and some of said bales, partially charred,
were, for the purpose of preventing their consumption and further
spread of said fire, thrown into the lines of the highway where the
injury happened, and close to the principal travelled track, and
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were byi the defendants stiffered so to remain within the lines of the
said highway, and close to the said travelled track, and for several
hours after one of the Selectmen of said town had notice thereof.
'nd until after the injury took place.
Evidence was introduced to prove that where said bales of hay
Tay the road was a good, perfect, smooth, and level road, fit and
iafe for travel in all its parts, more than fifty feet in width, from
rie place where any of said bales of hay lay, to some buildings
,in the opposite side of said road, and that teams in passing 'this
place were not confined to any particular path, but travelled at the
pleasure of the driver over a space of 40 feet in width or more in
said road, although the greater part of the travel at that point
generally passed near to where said bales of hay were lying at the
time of the accident.
The defendant requested the court to charge the jury that
although some of said bales of hay might have been within the
lines of the highway, and might by their so being there have
frightened the horse, and thereby have caused the injury, yet if
they further found that, at the place where said bales of hay lay,
and at the time when said injury happened, the road was in all
other respects made of sufficient width, smooth and level for the
safety of travellers and their teams in passing, and was not in any
respect insufficient or out of repair at the place aforesaid, otherwise than that, by said bales of hay lying within the lines of said
highway, as aforesaid, horses might take fright, then the plaintiffs
are not entitled to recover.
But the court refused so to charge, and thereupon the defendants excepted not only to the refusal, but also to the charge given,
which is sufficiently recited in the opinion.
Section 41 of Chapter 25 of the General Statutes provides that
"If any special damage shall happen to any person, his team, cariiage, or other property, by means of the insufflieney or want of
repairsof any highway," the person sustaining such damage shall
have a right to recover the same in an action on the case, &c.
J. -Prenchand By. B. Hard,for plaintiff, cited Helsey v. Glover,
15 Vt. 708; 18 Maine 286; Cassidj v. Stolekbrdge, 21 Vt. 891;
Willard-v. Newury, 22 Vt. 458; Batty
1 v. 2Duzbur, 24 Vt. 168;
Barton and Wife v. Montpelier, 30 Vt. 650; See also, Angell on
Highways, §§ 259, 261, 262; Winship v. -,nfield, 42 N. H. 197;
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a,
.i;v. .Enfield,43 N. H. 856 ; Littleton v. -Richardson,32
N. H. 59; -Dimmock v. ,Suffield, 30 Conn. 129; K eith v. Easton,
2 Allen 552; Kidder v. -Dunstable,7 Gray 104 ; Vinal v. Dorchester, 7 Gray 421; Howard v. N. Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189.
. Maeok and S. IT. -Davis,for defendant, cited Hixon v. Lovell,,
13 Gray 59; Smith v. Wendell, 7 Cush. 498; Final v. -Dorchester, 7 Gray 421; Shephardson v. Coleraine, 13 Met. 55; 2oward
v. . Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 9, 189; Kellogg v. IYorthampttn, 4
Gray 65; .Davis v. -Dudley,4 Allen 557; Marble v. Worcester,
4 Gray 895; -Dickey v. H. Tel. Go., 46 Maine 483; Farnham
v. Concord, 2 N. H. 393; Holley v. W. T. . Go., 1 Aikin 74;
Glidden v. Reading, 39 Vt. ; Cassidy v. Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391;
Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. ; Sessions v. Newport, 23 Vt. 708; Kingsbury v. .Dedham, 7 Am. Law Reg. 61; Pelch v. Gilman, 22 Vt.
38; -People v. Utica J. C., 15 Johns. 358; Griswold v..Nat. Ins.
Co., 3 Cowen 89.
STEELE, J.-This cause has been three times argued. We
understand from the case, as well as from the statement of the
defendants' counsel at the first argument, that so far as the liability of the town might depend on the length of time that the
bales of hay had been suffered to lie upon the highway, or upon
proper notice to the town officers that they were there, the rulings
of the County Court were such that the defendants took no exception. The case, therefore, stands in this court on precisely the
same ground that it would if it were conceded that the hay, which
had been unlawfully deposited by the railway company upon the
margin of the public highway, had been suffered to remain there
an unreasonable time with the full knowledge of the officers of the
town. No question arises in this court upon the plaintiffs' prudence. The only exception reserved is made to the pro forma
ruling of the County Court, that even though the surface and
width of the travelled track were faultless, and .the bales of hay
were outside that track upon the highway margin, still the town
would-" the case in all other respects being made out"-be liable
if the bales of h.-y "presented such an appearauce that they might
reasonably be eapected to, and naturallywould, frighten ordinary
horses," and the injury happened by reason of the plaintiffs' horse
taking fright at them. The points relied on by the defence arc,
first. that the lales of hay were upon the margin 4if the re,: 1;
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and, secondly, that the accident was occasioned by fright at them
and not by collision with them. The case fairly presents the mere
question, whether towns owe a statutory duty to travellers, for the
breach of which the party suffering special damage may maintain
an action, to remove from the margins of their highways objects
unlawfully deposited there, which, by their frightful appearance,
make it unsafe to travel the road with ordinary horses?
I. Does the fact that the hay lay upon the margin instead of
the path of tlie highway alter the rule of liability?
If a town may be liable for a failure to remove an object unlawfully deposited upon the travelled track, for the reason that it
obstructs travel by its frightful appearance, and thus renders the
road unsafe, they must be equally liable when the object lies upon
the margin, and naturally produces-as the jury under the charge
have found it did in this case-precisely the same result. The
result produced is, that the wrought path cannot 'be safely used by
travellers. The cause which produces the result is an unlawful
deposit of private property within the lines of the highway under
the control of the town. If towns are bound to regulate their
conduct with any reference to security from fright, less cannot be
required of them than the removal of such obstructions as were
complained of in this case, from any part of the highway, when
their effect is to make the whole of it unsafe. This, of course, is
said with the qualification that the duty does not attach until the
town know of the obstruction, or ought to know of it. Nor would
it attach while the property is lying upon the highway a reasonable time in loading or unloading, or for the ordinary purposes of
transportation. It is true that towns are not bound, where it is
unnecessary, to work the whole width of the highway, and if a
traveller voluntarily leaves the path to travel upon the margin, he
toes so at his own risk: Rice v. JMontpelier, 19 Vt. 470. But
towns have a right to control the whole width of the road, and
they have a corresponding duty. It is not necessarily a good
defence to a claim for damages that they were incurred by reason
of an obstruction upon the margin. On the contrary, it is well
settled that it is the duty of towns to forbid and prevent the use
of their highway margins as places of deposit for private property.
whether it be lumber, shingles, logs, or other matter that may
interfere with travel; and if they do negligently suffer the margis of their roads to become and remain unsafe by being thus
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encumbered, the-party who, without fault on his part, meets with
an accident by driving against them, may recover of the town.
Among the numerous cases recognising this doctrine are Cassidy
v. Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391; Snow v. Adams, 1 Cush. 443.
Nor does it alter the case that the party injured may sustain
an action against the person who placed the nuisance upon the
highway. It is the right of the party to proceed against the
town if they are. in fault, and the town may, if held to damages,
look to the individual who obstructed the highway. See 2vewbub?t
v. Pass. B. B. Co., 25 Vt. 377, and Willard v. NYewbury, 22 Id.
458. Assuming, then, that towns by such a neglect may become,
as has always been held, liable to travellers who from some unforeseen cause, not their own fault, diverge from the travelled
track and meet with damage by collision with the obstruction, it
follows that towns would still more clearly be liable when such
objects occasion damage to the traveller who does not diverge
from the accustomed path but uses the road in the ordinary manuer, provided towns may be liable at all for an injury occasioned
by fright. When the margin of the highway is encumbered by
an obstruction, and the obstruction is frightful in its appearance,
only the exceptional individual who leaves the path incurs the
danger of accident by collision, while everybody who travels any
part of the road confronts the danger of accident by fright. It
is very manifest that the error of the County Court, if any, does
not lie in the fact that the hay was upon the margin instead of
the travelled path. The question must simplify itself to an inquiry whether a town may be liable for such accidents by fright
as are the natural consequence of the obstruction they suffer to
remain on the road.
II. In examining this second question-whether towns are
bound to remove obstructions deposited upon their roads when
their natural operation is to occasion accidents by fright in using
ordinary horses-we must, as in all questions upon a statutory
liability, have recourse to the statute and gather its meaning, as
we can, from its language, its reason, and purpose; from the light
'-Ied upon it by the other statutory provisions relating to the same
general subject, and by the judicial interpretation it has received.
The statute in terms requires towns to 7keep their highways in
"good and sufficient repair," and makes them liable for special
,'au1'es sustained by reason of their "ih.sifffi ciency or want of
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repair." This language is quite broad enough- to cover a case
where a road cannot safely be travelled with ordinary horses. A
statute, however, should not always be interpreted literally. It
is often and properly said that this statute is not intended to
impose an absolute liability upon towns for every insufficiency.
They are only required to do what is practicable to be done to
provide and preserve a condition of reasonable safety in their
roads with reference to the amount and kind of travel they
accommodate:' Prindle v. TPletclher, 39 Vt. 255. But, it can
hardly be said that a road in which obstructions are suffered to
be placed and remain, which by their appearance are calculated
t6 frighten ordinary horses, is in a condition of reasonable safety
for travel of any ordinary kind or amount. Nor is it impracticable to prevent the continuance of such an obstruction. It is
well understood that the duty of the town is not limited to the
furnishing of a proper width and smoothness of path. The cases
are numerous where towns have been held liable for not erecting
proper muniments or barriers to protect travellers from accidentally going out of the road. See Glidden v. Beading, 38 Vt. 52.
So, too, in a late case, a town was held liable in Massachusetts
for damages from the falling of an unsafe awning which was so
built as to extend over the road and endanger the travel which
passed under it: -Dayv. lliford, 5 Allen 98. The purpose of
the statuteis to secure to the public safe highways. That purpose may be as effectually defeated by an obstruction which impedes travel by its frightful appearance as by one which, if it is
hit, will be an obstacle to the secure passage of the wheels of a
carriage. The land taken for the highway is taken for the public
use as a highway. The statute has armed the towns with full
authority to interfere with tie appropriation of it to any private
use inconsistent with an unembarrassed enjoyment of the public
easement. It provides that if any person "shall erect any en,roachment, or make any obstruction, or put any nuisance upon
any highway," the selectmen may command or cause its removal.
It also provides that no person shall "wilfully fell any trees, lay
any timber, or place any obstruction or other nuisance so as te
obstruct, hinder, or inzpede the passing in such highway," without
l-ei:]g liable to a fine, and also to the payment to the town, or to
a,;y individual, of any damages sustained by either: Gen. Stat.
. 204, 5, 6, §§ 66, 69. 71. Thec statutes, whil arc a part
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of the General Highway Law, shed some light upon the question
of the extent of responsibility intended to be imposed upon towns
with relation to their roads. It is beyond doubt that the placing
of an obstruction upon a public way, which, by its frightful
appearance or otherwise, would "hinder and impede passing,"
might subject the party who made the obstruction to fine and
damages, and, if continued, might subject the town to indictment
or to damages if the cause of an accident by collision. It is not
easy to see the ground upon which the town should be entirely
exempted from liability for the other and natural consequence of
the obstruction-an accident by fright. In Kelsey v. Glover, 15
Vt. 708, the town was held liable for an obstruction because it
was naturally calculated to, and actually did, add to the dangerous consequences of the accident from fright. Would the town
have escaped liability if the obstruction by its natural operation
had caused the fright instead of merely adding to its evil results ?
In many of the cases towns are held liable, although some accident, not the fault of the plaintiff or the defendant, contributes
to the accident complained of. See Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411.
A town may reasonably be held to a higher responsibility, after
notice, with reference to the removal of obstructions made by
private property, unlawfully deposited upon the road-a duty
easily performed and under the statute at the expense of the
party who caused the obstruction-than with reference to the
removal of equally dangerous obstructions which either exist
naturally in the soil or are cast upon the margin in the process of
working the road, which to a reasonable extent is a legitimate use
of the margin. The traveller has reason to expect that the highway will have the ordinary and reasonable encumbrances which
arise from the nature of the soil and country, and its being worked
and repaired in a proper manner; but he had no reason to apprehend that the town have suffered these dangers to be increased by
allowing the land taken for public use to become unlawfully appropriated to private uses as a place of deposit for property which
will inany manner obstruct or impede travel, whether by frightening his horse or clogging his wheels.
The recent decisions of the courts of Massachusetts, for the
learning and ability of which we have great respect, tend to a difICrunt result from the one reached by us: .Keitl v. Bmton, 2
Allen 552; Kinys ,ij v. Dedtarn, 13 Id. 186; Co. v. (71harle,-
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town, Id. 190-1 n. These cases are strongly relied on by the
defence, and we have on account of their authority given the case
before us a more extended examination than we otherwise should.
But it is to be noticed, that at least two of these cases present such
a state of facts as not necessarily to fall within the operation of the
rules, which we think should govern this case. The daguerrean
saloon, which stood upon a carriage by the roadside, in the case of
Keith v. -aston, was, manifestly, not an object "which might
reasonably be -expected to frighten ordinary horses ;" and the
fluttering of loose canvass upon its roof was not the natural operation to be expected from the object. The pile of gravel fifteen
inches high, complained of in Kinysbwy v. Dedam, was that day
lawfully and properly placed upon the road, to be spread over its
surface in the ordinary course of repairs. It may be questioned
how far the reasoning of the court, and it is upon this that the
defendants here rely, would in Massachusetts be an authority, in
a case presenting different elements of fact. It is doubtful
whether the injuries for which towns may be held, can be satisfactorily classified and defined. Each case should stand upon its
own facts. The note of the third case, Cooc v. OC'Zarlestown, does
not state whether the defendants had notice of the obstruction,
and the opinion of the court is not reported. It is not, therefore,
certain, from the report, that the court there held that, if the dead
horse had been negligently suffered by the defendants, after
notice, to lie in the street, the defendants would be exempted
from liability for an accident which naturally resulted from the
obstruction, simply because it was occasioned by fright instead of
collision. If, however, such was the decision, the case is as
strongly in point for the defendants as any case can be. Such an
object as a dead horse in a street, would almost inevitably occasion
accidents by fright, and would far more endanger and obstruct
travel, by its tendency to frighten horses, than by its likelihood to
disturb the passage of wheels by collision. In Lund v. T 1ngsborougih, 11 Cush. 563, though a new trial was granted, it was
held that the plaintiff might recover without proving actual contact with the defect, and although the fright of the horse contributed to the accident; but the recent decision of iTorton v. Tautton, 9T Mass. 266, seems to have qualified this to some extent., for.
if a town is not bound to guard against fright, they should not be
against its consequences. It may be possible, that the courts of
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Massachusetts have become more inclined to give the defendants,
in these cases, the benefit of any doubt upon the meaning of the
statute, from the fact that for a long time the action under their
statute was substantiallypenal in its nature-the party injured
recovering, if the town had notice of the defect, double damages:
See Mass. Stat. of 1781, c. 81, § 7; Rev. Stat. lass. 1836, c. 25.
§ 22. By their statute of 1850, c. 5, the recovery became limited
to actual damages. The liability of towns for injuries by fright,
occasioned by obstructions upon the highway margin, seems in
New Hampshire to have been rather assumed as a matter of
course, as an unquestionable proposition, than to have been decided
as a debatable question of law: Tinship v. -nfield, 42 N. H.
199, 200, 216; Chamberlain,v. Enfield, 43 Id. 858-60; Littleton,
v. Bichardson, 32 Id. 59. In all these cases, the injury occurred
by fright at lumber placed upon the road, or its margin. In all
of them, the Nisi Pius Court held that towns might be liable for
damages incurred in that manner. In two of taem a new trial
'was granted for other errors, but in all of them satisfaction was
expressed with the ruling below in this respect, though it does not
seem to have been questioned in argument. The case of Dimock
v. The Town of Suffield, 30 Conn. 129, was an action for an
injury received by the plaintiff's horses taking fright at some
white plastering on the margin of the road, piled up, as the case
finds, nearly to the height of the road-bed, but so as to be "in no
manner an obstruction to the public travel, except so far as it
might frighten horses." The point was distinctly made by the
defendants, that the town could not be held liable for a defect of
that nature. The court, in their bpinion, delivered by HiNMAz,
C. J., say, that whether any duty devolved upon the town with
reference to the pile of plastering, "depends upon whether it was
in its general operation calculated to flighten horses of ordinary
gentleness." He also adds: "There can be no doubt that a road
may be rendered unsafe by objects upon it calculated to frighten
animals ;" but "whether a slight discoloration ly the side of the
road, such as was caused in this case by the plastering that laythere,
was in fact an object calculated to frighten horses which are usually
gentle, and therefore fit to be driven, is an entirely different question." It appeared in that case that the plaintiff's horse was shy
and timid, and a decision against the plaintiff was advised, upon
the ground that there was "heedlessness amounting to negligence
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on the pl :intiff's part. which was the cause of the injury, and
that with .he exercise of reasonable care he would have passed the
olject." It is also said by CARPE .TER,J., in .ewison v. Yew
ffaven, 7 Am. Law Reg. 783, that "any object upon or near the
travelled path, which in its nature is calculated to frighten horses
,,f ordinary gentleness, being likely to obstruct the use of the way,
,,]V constitute a defect in the way itself." The statutes as well
:,s
the decisions of Connecticut and New Hampshire, relating to
the responsibility of towns for injuries upon the highways, more
closely resemble ours, than do those of Maine or Massachusetts.
We think, that not only the language and purpose of our statutes,
-:1d the reason and spirit of our decisions, but also a proper regard
to public policy, require us to hold that the defendant town is
liable for the natural consequence to the plaintiffs, of a negligent
failure to remove the obstruction unlawfully deposited in the highway, which "presented such an appearance, that it might reasonably be expected to, and naturally would, frighten ordinary
horses." The expression of the court below, that towns are bound
to remove from their roads all objects calculated to frighten ordinary horses would be open to criticism, if it stood alone. It was,
however, necessarily limited and applied to the bales of hay complained of. No other obstruction was in proof, and the remark
could not have misled the jury. The result is, the judgment of
the County Court is affirmed.
WILson, J., and Pnou-, J., concurred. IPIERPOINT, C. J., having presided in the court below, and PECK, J., being a tax-payer
in the defendant town, did not sit; but after judgment they
expressed their concurrence with the views stated in the opinion.
KELLOGG, J., who was upon the bench, and heard the case when
first argued, entertained the same views.
ARARETT, J.,

dissented.

We have read the foregoing opinion
uith more than common interest, be,ansa it discusses a point in t.h law,
affecting the responsibility of towns for
the condition f their highways, which
is of great practical importance, as well
to the towns as to the public at larc, and
in regard 4a whI'h theze seems, of hac
certainly, -tinu.m-y or dispo:i,,u, -r

some quariers, to admit considerable
relaxation of what has long been considered the established doctrine upon the
snbiect. And we think it must be admittedI that the opinion possesses two
very essential merits, as a judicial declaration of the law ; it follows the established principles of law upon the subject,
1'oth iu tlu.tstate and elsewhere, an!

moRSE v. TOWN OF RICHMOND.
deftines a course of action and responsibility, which is, at the same time, both
safe and intelligible, as well for towns
as for travellers upon the highways.
There are two motives which seem to
us to have combined to unsettle the law
upon this particular question, the responsibility of towns for objects carelessly suffered to remain within the
limits of the travelled portion of the
highway, calculated to frighten quiet, or
ordinarily quiet, and gentle horses: that
is, (1) a timid apprehension that towns
may thereby become responsible for unreasonable watchfulness, and even ludicrous obstructions to quiet travelling;
and also, (2) in some instances, perImps, a feeling of love of discovery of
some good mode of escape from the embarrassing dilemma.
It cannot be denied that both these
motives are laudable, and entirely consistent with a high degree of ability and
fitness for the wise and judicious administration of justice: but at the same
time it is undeniable that they have both
contributed largely to the production of
bad law, and have produced more erroneous decisions than they have ever
cured, in a tenfold proportion.
The case of Chamberlian v..Enfield,
43 N. 11. 356, seems to us to place the
question upon its true basis, that it must
be regarded as a question of fact for the
jury, whether an object outside of the
travelled portion of the highway is a
defect or obstruction to its safe use, by
reason of its liability to frighten horses.
There is no valid reason apparent to us
why this question may not as safely be
intrusted to juries under proper limitations, to be defined and fixed by the
courts, as any othtr questions of fact
arising in this class of cases.
There is no question that as the responsibility of towns in such cases is
exclusively a statutory one, the courts
c.re ound to a rcasonably strict construction in reaar, to i: extent. But

at the same time it should not be so
much restricted as to fail reasonably to
secure its object, the maintaining of a
safe transit for travelling along the
highway. For, notwithstanding some
variation in the statutes of the different states, all substantially agree in
requiring the municipality to provide
and maintain a safe and convenient passage for travellers. This unquestionably
primarily applies to the travelled portion of the highway. So that one who
for mere convenience, and without actual
necessity, departs from the travelled
portion of the highway, cannot recover
for any injury he may sustain thereby,
in consequence of obstructions to passage. Such obstructions are not required
to be removed from any portion of the
laid out highway except that which is
prepared for the passage of travellers,
as the English call it, the "1metalled"
portion of the highway.
But it would be a very imperfect view
of the subject to conclude that this portion of the highway is all that towns are
bound to look after. If that were so,
there would be no necessity for taking
and no power to take more land for the
use of the highwaythan is reasonably
necessary for making the travelled path.
And although it might require the use
of the adjacent land, to some extent, in
the course of construction and repair,
that, being a temporary use, would nor
require the taking of the land. And,
therefore, where towns are allowed to
take for the highway from three to six
rods in width through its whole extent,
it must be concluded that something
more is expected than a mere track of
sufficient breadtli to enable carriages to
pass each other. It was no doubt intended to guard against intrusion from
the adjoining landowners, and thus protect- the traveller, to a reasonable extent,
against such sights awl noises as might
render the passing along the highway
embarrassing or impossible. Anl -.I-
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though it is not po~silblc to guard against
all occurrences calculated to frighten
teams, this is no reason why tile towns
and cities !hiould not be responsible for
putting, or allowing others to put, the
margins of the highway to such uses,
more or less permanent, as will discommode or destroy the safe and comfortable
use of the travelled portion of the same.
For if the margins of the highway may
lawfully be put fo any and all uses
known to modern advancement in manufactures by machinery, there are few
horses of such quiet demeanor that they
could be trusted to carry a vehicle safely
through its clamor and exhibition.
The truth is, no such thing was ever
expected or would be for a moment tolerated. No such thing is claimed. Rut
it seems to be supposed by some that
while all such operations along the sides
of the travelled path in highways are
clearly nuisances, and so abatable by the
municipal authority, still the traveller
has no claim for damages sustained by
reason of that acknowledged municipal
duty being omitted.
It amay be true that some of the statutory provisions in the different states are
so defectively drawn as to produce this
anomalous result, that while the traveller, without fault on his part, suffers
pecuniary damage by reason of the
omission of the municipalities to perform
their-duty in regard to the highways, he
is without redress. But it is safe to
conclude no such result was intended to
follow from the provisions of the statute,
aid none such should be invited by the
courts, on the ground of mere construetion. It could only be tolerated upon
tiie ground of strict necessity, as the inevitable result of some defect in the
laguagc of such statutes.
There may possibly be some difficulty
in defining the precise limits of municipal rcponsibility for not removing
obstructions to the safe use or the highwhen such obstructious do not
w,

limits of the travelled
come within tile
path. There would be the grate-t embarrassment in laying down any rule of
law that would apply with precision to
each particular cae as it should occur.
That would manifestly be impracticable.
But it would in our apprchension be a
very lame conclusion to make from this
acknowledged difficulty, that no obligation could safely be imposed upon the
municipalities in. regard to such obstructions to safe travelling. The same difficulties exist upon all questions of negligence and duty, until by repeated trials
some definite rule is established. It was
so in regard to accidental obstructions
statute
in the travelled path, until tile
interposed and fixed the time for removal
at twenty-four hours. It was so in regard to demand and notice upon negotiable paper, until the convenience of
commercial usage fixed the time at one
day for each successive endorser to notify
his next guarantor.
And with all due submission it has
argument
never seemed to us that tile
ab inconrenienti or the reductio ad absurduma, which is so much resorted to in
these cases, was at all satisfactory or
conclusive. Because it is not possible to
remove all objects which tend to frighten
animals passing along the highway, is
that any sound reason why one manifestly of that character, and clearly there
by intrusion, should not be removed ?
And if not, can any good reason be
assigned why the municipalities should
not be held responsible to travellers for
damage resulting from their culpable
negligence in not removing the same ?
Where, therefore, the judge gravely tells
the traveller that if his horse is frightened at the sudden appearance of the full
the Irsting of a clap of thunmoon, o."
der, he is remediless, wil it be likely to
spirit of-acquiafford him mu,.h of tile
escence in the wisdom of the law for
allowing a threbling-machine or a winedmill to be permanently operated witin
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the limits of the highway? The passing of a flock of wild geese so near the
ground as to cause a whirr and a rush of
air, might possibly frighten some brute
animals, or some not entirely so; but to
he told that there is no relief, would be
hut poor consolation, when the man is
complaining of a menagerie having
taken permanent possession of the highway and thus driving his team mad. It
is always possible to put extreme cases,
where the traveller might suffer the same
dIanmge and be wholly remediless. But
unless they are more analogous, in principle, than some which have been called

in to foreclose the discussion on this
question, there would be slight relief
given.
If towns may render the highways
unsafe for ordinary use by travellers by
the bewildering sights and noises publicly and permanently tolerated upon
their margins, there will be slight benefit in having any such margins, or, indeed, in having any highways at all.
The case of Drake v. Lowell, 13 Alet.
292, clearly recognises the principle for
which we contend. And we do not so
much object to the more recent cases in
M\assachusetts, where this rule is attempted to be restricted within narrower
limits. The case of Rixon v. Lowell,
13 Gray 59, where towns and cities were
held not responsible for damage resulting from ice and snow falling from the
roofs of buildings adjoining the streets,
is unquestionably sound, as a general
rule. There might possibly occur an
exceptional case, where the town or city
might be required to remove a mass of
overhanging ice or snow, more obstructing to the safe use of the highway than
any such ice or snow would be if actually
fallen upon the track. It might present
a case for the jury, as in Luther v. Worcester, 97 Mass. 268. But in such case,
it might be regarded mere foolhardiness
for the traveller to venture upon such
imminent peril, and so preclude a re-
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covery on that ground. But clearly
highway travellers are not bound to
watch the snow and ice upon the roofs
of buildings adjoining the highways.
And in Keith v. Easton, 2 Allen 552,
where the town was held not responsible
for the result of fright to horses caused
by a daguerrean saloon along the margin
of the highway, the decision may be
sound, but we should have deemed it a
case of such doubt as to be submitted to
a jury, as was done in the principal case.
We trust the courts will not be so much
alarmed at the outcry against juries in
finding towns responsible for damage to
travellers upon the highway, as to adopt
constructions virtually repealing the
statutes affording redress in such cases,
for the remedy is needed, and jurors, if
properly instructed by the courts, will
be sure to render safe verdicts.
Since preparing the foregoing we are
gratified to learn that the Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire, in the
case of Bartlett v. Hooksett, 47 N. H.,
have sustained the same view for which
we contend, in opposition to that
adopted in Massachusetts in the cases
already referred to, and the later ones
of Kingsbury v. Dedham, 13 Allen 186,
and Cook v. Charlestown, Id. 190, in
note. The point ruled in the New
Hampshire case was, that objects suffered to remain resting upon one spot,
or confined within one particular space
within the highway, if they are of such
a shape or character as to be manifestly
likely to frighten horses of ordinary
gentleness, constitute "obstructions" or
"insufficiencies," for which the town is
liable. The obstruction here was a pigsty projecting into the highway and
occupied by five swine, the declaration
alleging that the horse was frightened
by the swine "starting and running
about," and by certain loud noises
which the swine then and there uttered.
It is not improper, we trust. for us to
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tL. 't!::; a,l ,cwe to the, ;n,
rll'e Uln this illirlant sul lcct, by a
,.ourt of so much weight of authority, is
gratifying upon more than one account.
It gives hope that the frequency of this
of actions and the tenidency wh1

"urics to hold the municipalities re,)on-ilc,
will not have the effect to lead
all courts to so far re-trict; the extent
of that responsibility by constructions

to virtutlly dcstroy the

ictiebi"

effects of the statutes UtlOn til iubject
And we trust it may not be regarded a4
entireiv inadmissible to say that it aflords great support to one travelling down
due wed-tern declivity of life to find sotte
azsurances, as he pas-cs along, that all
the lights of his life have not hecom.
extinguished before he reaches hi" jonrI. F. II.
ney's end.

supre2ne Court of .fcw Tersey.
WILLIA3M J. LYND v. GEORGE 31ENZIES, JOHN II. SUYDAM. ANT)
OTHERS.'
A minister of the Protestant Episcopal Church has either the possession of tllh
hurch edifice or a right in the nature of an casement to enter therein, on all
,,,ea!ions set apart in tie parish for divine services, and a substantial interftfrencv
it ith such right will lay the ground for an action at law.
Tile English ecclesiastical lav forms the basis of the law regulating the affairs
of this denomination of Christians.
In order to vc-t the pastor with the ordina'ry rights in the temporalities pcruaaing to his office it is not necessary for the congregation to be incorporated, nor
that the title to the church should be lodged in such congregation.
A Protestant Episcopal minister was barred out of the church building on a
Sunda, by his wardens and vestrymen : Ield,that a verdict for substantial damages
fbr such act, in a suit by the minister, should not be disturbed.

Tjrs was an action on the case for forcibly preventing a minister

from preaching in the church and occupying the parochial schoolhouse. Upon the trial the following facts were elicited: By a
deed dated 1st October 1853, Cyrus Peck and wife conveyed
the lot upon which the church and school-house are now erected,
to the Rectors, Wardens, and Vestrymen of the Church of St.
Barnabas, Roseville, in the city of Newark, in fee, upon the condition that a church and school-house should be erected thereon,

and which church edifice should be consecrated, appropriated, and
Kevotedl for ever exclusively to the service of Almighty God,
:~',cording to the doctrine, discipline, and worship of the Protestant

Episcopal Church in the United States of America.

At the time

IWe are in,lebted for this case to Charles Borcherling, Jr., Esq., plaintiff's
eounse.-Ers..%r. LAW REG.
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of this conveyance the said church was not incorporated, and did
not become so until after the expulsion of the minister, as hereinafter stated.
On the 28d July, 1855, this church was consecrated by the
bishop of the diocese of New Jersey, and from that time forward
the congregation continued its organization. In December, 1861,
the plaintiff accepted a call to the rectorship of this church, and
in the month of June, 1862, was duly instituted. It appeared
that the plaintiff, in common with the other officers of the church,
supposed the church had been incorporated and that various corporate acts were performed. Before his call, the church had
claimed and been conceded ecclesiastical rights which pertained
to incorporated churches only; after the call of the plaintiff, a
school-house was put up on the church lot, and he was placed in
possession. On the 27th April, 1867, the plaintiff received a note
from two of the defendants, who were the wardens of the church,
notifying him that on Easter Day, which was then passed, his connection as rector with the church had ceased. On the next day,
which was Sunday, when the plaintiff went to the church to officiate he found the church closed, the doors being fastened, so as
to prevent his entering. In a few days afterwards he was in a
similar manner excluded from the school-house. It was proved
that such expulsions were the acts of the defendants, two of whom
were wardens and the others vestrymen of the church. The question of law as to the right of the plaintiff to recover was reserved,
and the matter of damages submitted to the jury, who returned a
verdict for S1000.
The case came before this court on a motion for a new trial.
. Parker and Charles Borcherling, Jr., for plaintiff.
-oseph P. Bradley, for defendants.
BEASLEY, C. J.-The motion for a new trial in this case is
rested on two grounds, viz. : first, that the proofs will not sustain
an action at law; second, that the damages are excessive.
On the first of these heads the ground taken is, that at the time
when the plaintiff became the rector of this congregation, and also
at the time of the transaction complained of, the congregation
was not incorporated. From this fact it was urged that the title
under the deed from Mr. Peck could not pass out of him for the
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want of a competent grantee to take it, and that the members of
the congregation were in ],osscs4ion of the premises as tenants
iii coninin by sufferance, and that, consequently, such rights in
the realty as ordinarily pass to the rector under a regular organization, did not in the present case vest.
So far as the law has to do with the relationship of the rector
with his flock, such relationship is to be regarded as the effect of
a contract.
What then is the agreement into which a congregation of this
denomination of Christians enters upon the call of a rector ? So
far as touches the matter in controversy, it plainly appears to be
this: They offer to the minister receiving the call such rights in
their temporalities as by the ecclesiastical law of their sect belong
to the office which is tendered, one of such rights being that of
prcaching on Sundays in the church provided by the congregation.
Such an offer, therefore, can have nothing to do with the title to
the church edifice. No matter in whom the title may reside, if
the congregation has the use of the building, the rector must of
necessity have the right to partake in such use. The agreement
is not, as the argument on the part of the defendants assumed,
that the rector is to possess this class of privileges in these temporalities of which the congregation is the absolute owner. But
to the contrary, whatever place the congregation provide for the
purpose of public worship in the parish, into such place the rector,
by virtue of his office, has the right to enter in order to conduct
such worship. I have failed, therefore, to perceive how the fact
of title to the church premises in question is to affect the legal
result in this case; in the view which I take of the understanding
between these parties, it cannot matter at all whether or not the
congregation had any interest in these premises other than a right
to the occupation of them for the purpose of Divine service on the
Sunday of the expulsion; because, if on that occasion this building was the place set apart by the congregation for their religious
exercises, then it necessarily follows that the plaintiff at that time,
virtute officii, had the legal right to be present and to conduct the
worship. But the case in reality is much stronger in favor of the
plaintiff than this. This church property was put into the possession of this congregation for their denominational uses by Mr.
Peck, the owner of the fee; they had erected their church upon
it, and thus complied with the conditions of the grant; it is true
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the title at law was defective, but it iz also true that thu'r ,Itlc in
equity was complete. This chureh, thus built, had been consecrated by the bishop of the dioccse , and by institution, pi.rfhrnd

with all due ecclesiastical formalities, the plaintiff had been placed
in charge of the spiritual affairs of the church; the congregation
remained in full possession of the church edifice, and neither Mr.
Peek nor any one else called such possession in question. Under
the circumstances, how is it possible that these defonda.nts, who
claim to be the representatives of the congregation, can deny the
rights of the rector as to these premises on the ground of the
inferiority of their own title ? Suppose we regard them as mere
tenants at sufferance, will that fact enable them to put aI end to
the rights of the plaintiff in this property ? If such were their
position, the only effect would be to make both their own rights
and those of the rector dependent on the will of the owner of the
land. But it certainly would be contrary to all principle to permit
a party in possession of real property to grant an interest in it to
another, and then defeat such interest on the ground of his own
inability to make such grant. The rule that a party cannot derogate from his own grant is one of universal efficacy, and applies
in a very direct manner to the present case; nor is there anything
in the suggestion that the usual rights touching the temporalities
which vest in the rector, could not be obtained by him in the
present instance, on account of the imperfection of the ecclesiastical organization of this congregation; the imperfection relied
on was the absence of an incorporation. But the want of this
quality does not at all affect the rights and duties of pastor and
people towards each other; the effect of becoming incorporated
is to facilitate the acquisition and transfer of property, and to
enable the congregation to be represented in the convention of the
diocese: Article V. of Constitution of P. E. C. of Diocese of New
Jersey. But, by the canonical law of this denomination of Christians, it is not necessary, in order to constitute *achurch, that the
congregation should take the form of an incorporated body. Indeed, the very law of this state, which provides for the incorporation of this class of churchds, presupposes, and requires, that
there shall be antecedent to the inception of proceedings "a congregation of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this state duly
organized, according to the constitution and usages of said
church :" Act of 1829. In the case now before us. it plainly
VOL. XVII.-7
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appears that this church wa- coiittttcd in conformity ti ithtz
ecclesiastical law and usage.- apipiicable to it; and the coilsejuence is, that tie plaintiii" by his official connection with it.
z)cquircd al tile customary powers and privileges pertaining to
he rectorship.
But there was a second objection taken on the argument, which
,.%as, that on the assumption of the existence of the right of the
rector to the privileges claimed by him, still it was said, an innovation or disturbance of such rights would not constitute the
ground of a suit at law.
I cannot yield my assent to this proposition. The nature of
Lhe right in qjuestion forbids such a result. I think it is clear
that, in right of his office, a rector, by force of the law of this
zhurch, has either the possession of the church edifice, or has a
privilege which enables him to enter into it-such privilege being
in the nature of an easement. Mr. Murray Hoffman, in his
learned and interesting treatise on the law of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States, page 266, in remarking
on the effect of the incorporation of churches, states his views in
these terms, viz.: "The title then to the church and all church
property is in the trustees, collectively, for all corporate purposes;
but there is another class of purposes purely ecclesiastical, as to
which the statute did not mean to interfere or prescribe any rule.
These are to be controlled by the law of the church." And the
conclusion to which he comes is thus stated: "That the control
and possession of the church edifice upon Sundays, and at all
limes when open for divine services, appertains exclusively to the
rector." I have no doubt with regard to the correctness of this
View. By the English ecclesiastical law, which, although somewhat modified by new circumstances and by American usages and
statutes, constitutes the substantial basis of the law controlling
the affairs of this particular church, the possession of the church
and churchyard is in the incumbent; nor does it make any difference in this respect in whose hands the title to the religious property is lodged, as for example, in case the freehold of the church
and churchyard is in the rector, ifevertheless, the curate will be
deemed in possession for all ecclesiastical purposes. In exemplification of this rule, I refer to an interesting discussion of the question in areen.,iade v. Darby, decided during the present year by the
Court of Queen's Bench, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 421. "I quite agree
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%.Ith 1,hf~r:ner decisions." Such is the declaration of Chief
Justice CocKBuRNx, that an incumbent has possession of the churchyard as well as of the church for all spiritual purposes; therefore
for burials, and for all purposes attached to his office, he has undoubtedly uncontrolled possession of the churchyard. To the
same purpose is the rule laid down by Cripps in his treatise on
the Church and Clergy, page 158; See, also, 1 Burn's Ecclesiastical Law 377; Stocks v. Booth, 1 T. R. 428. If,then, we
adopt this theory, and I perceive no reason for rejecting it, that
for the purpose of the exercise of his sacerdotal functions the
rector becomes possessed of the church buildings and grounds, it
will be difficult to devise any pretext in denial of the right of such
officer to a civil remedy if such possession be invaded. Nor does
the right to redress for an interference with his rights, seem leis
clear, if we adopt the hypothesis, that by force of his position the
plaintiff was possessed of an easement in these premises. Such a
privilege would not be unlike in kind to a right to the occupation
of a pew in a church; and of this latter right in the case of The
PresbyterianChurch v. Andrtss, 1 Zabriskie 328, Chief Justice
G-REENT remarks, it "is an incorporeal hereditament.
It is in the
nature of an easement, a right or privilege in the lands of
another. For an interruption of this right, an action on the case
for a disturbance, as in other cases of injury to incorporeal hereditaments, is the only remedy." Regarding, then, the rector's
interest in the church edifice as a mere right to enter and while
there to discharge certain functions, I am unable to distinguish it,
in its substantial essence, from the right of the pewholder. The
right of the latter is obviously no more secular in its character
than the former; both the pewholder and the minister attend to
the end of religious worship and edification, and as the pewholder
has a remedy at law for a disturbance of his privilege, it would
seem to be preposterous to deny it to a minister for a like wrong.
Upon principle then, I think, the present action is to be vindicated, and for a precedent I refer to the case of -Pillbrownev.
Ryland, 8 Mod. 352, 2 Strange 624, in which it was decided
that an action would lie on behalf of a parish over against the
lerk of the vestry, for shutting the vestry-door and keeping the
nqaintiff out, so that he could not come in to vote, the rule of
• ,s:Lsion
in this case appears to be indistingui;hable from that
which is called for by the onc now before us.
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vi.cw above i, ieatcd, viz.,

thlat the plahitiff was il1u-e-.ion, o" that lie had a right to enter
;v ecial uccabions, the interfCrealco with cither of such intrests

a right of suit; the m io fact that the form of action
wv.uld be variant if we adopt one or the other theory, eannot affect
c;*, on1the prc.-ent muion, as tle real question in controversy
iu:ween the parties has ,een tUt,,, and consequently by force of
tl. lwovi.:ion ,f our )resent Practice Act, the mode of suit is now
alterablc, so a to conform to the legal view which the court may
adopt.
Influenced by these considerations, I have concluded that thc
plaintiff's right of action is sustained by the proofs in the case.
On the secon I head my judgment is also in favor of the plaint'fb; the damages are undoubtedly large, but this question was
left fairly to the jury, and there is no reason to suppose that they
were in any respect subjected to any sinister influence. The
defendants acted with great indiscretion; their conduct was
oppressive, and whatever their intentions may have been, it wa*
,al1culatcd to wound and injure the plaintiff.
The verdict should not be disturbed.

Uited States Circuit Court, Southern District of Georgit.
JOHN M. CUYLER v. JOHN C. FERRILL

AND OTHERS.

A state court of Georgia" during the late war had no jurisdiction to decree partition of lands in that state while one of the joint owners was a citizen and resident

in one of the other states adhering to the Union.
The United States courts, therefore, will take cognisance of a bill for partition
of such lands and disregard the previous judgment.
A purchaser at a judicial sale under the judgment of the state court wha has
paid only in Confederate notes cannot be regarded as a 6ond fide purchaser who
has paid.

JoHN M. CUYLEr, a citizen of Pennsylvania, filed his bill in
chancery in this court for partition and relief against John C.
Ferrill and others, citizens of Georgia.
Jeremiah Cuyler devised certain lots in Savannah to his daughters for and during their natural lives, and thereafter to his sons,
John M. and Teleman Ouyler, their heirs and assigns. The bill
set forth, that the life estate ceased in March 1863, and that the
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property then vested, in fee, in John -. Cuyler and in the heirs
of his brother Teleman, in undivided halves, Teleman having
died intestate anterior to the termination of the life estate; that
complainant has been informed that during the late civil war,
when all communication was interrupted, some of said parties
applied for a partition of said property, and under proceedings
of which he knew nothing, to which he was not a party, and of
which, at the time of filing the bill, he had no definite information, the said property was sold and purchased by John C. Ferrill aforesaid, who, as he has been informed, paid for the same in
notes issued by the late Confederate Government; that if such
proceedings were had, they were not binding on him; and, if intended to affect his rights, they were a fraud upon the same, and
unlawful; and prayed for a commission to divide and allot the
property, and for an account of the rents, income, and profits
from the death of the list surviving daughter, on the day
of Mfarch 1863.
The answer of defendants, except Ferrill, admitted the facts set
forth in the bill, and recited the proceedings for partition in the
Superior Court of Chatham county, ending in the sale of the lots
to Ferrill. The return of the commissioners to make partition
set forth the sale and payment of one-half the proceeds to the
heirs of Teleman Cuyler, and that they had a balance of $17,033
remaining in their hands, "which, under the will of the said Jeremiah Cuyler, is devised to Dr. John -. Cuyler, a surgeon in the
army of the United States. Of this amount, these commissioners,
under the exigencies of the Currency Act of the Confederate
States, have invested $17,000 in 4 per cent. certificates, and have
on hand $33.01 in currency of the Confederate States, issued
prior to the 17th February 1864." This return was included in
the record of the proceedings for partition, all of which was made
a part of the answer of these defendants.
Ferrill, in his answer, did not deny the facts as to the will and
complainant's title under it, &c.; admitted the payment of the
purchase-money in Confederate notes, but denied any fraud on
tile rights of complainant in the sale and purchase of the lots
aforesaid, and insisted that as a fiir and bond .lh' purchi--er, for
a valuable consideration, he had a full title to sai,! lots of land in
fee simple, and that no partition coull be decreed by this court.
To thesf. several .newers comiplainant filed 1is replications.
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51(3 : Thtib. It. 322; 1 Johns. Oh. 111; 4 Barb. 493; Story Eq.
Jur. § 646; 9 Cowen 546, 573; Rtich. Eq. I. 84; 2 Barb. 398;
Code of Georgia.
E.SKINI'u, J.-(After stating the facts.)-The proceedings relied
upon by the contesting defendant, Ferrill, in bar of the present
.-uit for partition, were had, as it seems, under the Code of Georgia, §§ 3896 to 3907, inclusive. These sections provide, among
other things, here unnecessary to mention, that if the party called
upon to answer the application for partition be absent from the
-tate, or has not been notified, he must, within twelve months
after the rendition of the judgment, move the court to set it
aside, or he will be concluded. "But in no event shall subseqtuent proceedings affect the title of a bond fide purchaser under
a sale ordered by the court :"' Code, § 3907.
The property, as already noted, was sold in the summer of 1863,
and the bill was filed in this court in the winter of 1867, nearly
four years thereafter. But from the view which I entertain of
tlis suit, the Statute of Limitations invoked is not a point for
decision.
Among other defences, Ferrill assumed the position that if there
was any irregularity in the proceedings of 1863, complainant must
address himself to the Superior Court of Chatham county, that
court alone having jurisdiction of the matter under the statutes
)f Georgia. And that view must be deemed correct unless there
be circumstances peculiar to the alleged proceedings for the
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partition-which contravene some governing principle or policy
of the common or positive law.
Another position taken by him was that he is a fair and bond
fide purchaser for value of the entire property, at a judicial sale,
and, therefore, that no partition can be made by this court.
If this argument is sound, then the complainant must go elsewhere to seek redress; for this court has no jurisdiction except
what is bestowed by the National Constitution and the laws of
Congress enacted in pursuance thereof. This defence appears to
be founded upon the concluding sentence of section 3907 of the
Code, but the defence is not, in my judgment, proved by the evidence. To entitle Ferrill to the benefit of it (supposing the proceedings and sale to have been legal), the purchase-money-the
36,000-must have been paid in money; whereas the proof is
that it was paid in "Confederate notes :" Boone v. Chiles, 10
Peters 177.
Here it may be observed, that it was fully discussed at the
hearing, whether the defence of bond fide purchaser can avail
against a legal' title; but the question seems not to be material to
the determination of this cause.
If Ferrill is to be treated as a purchaser, it must be in a very
limited sense of the term; he cannot be recognised as a purchaser
who has paid, but as one still indebted; as, for example, a defendant in fieri facias would be after payment to the marshal in a
worthless or depreciated currency: Griffn v. Tho~mpson, 2 How.
244; Buckhannon v.. Tinnin, Id. 258. See also 3 Id. 707.
Therefore, if the court could abstain from making partition, it
would do so on terms, and these terms will necessarily be, that
Ferrill, as purchaser, pay to complainant his share-being onehalf of the purchase-money in legal tender notes, with interest.
And even if the court should ultimately so decree, it would not
go so far as to accept such performance in lieu of partition until
after a return of the commissioners of this court, and not then
unless by mutual consent of the parties; or, as the last resort, in
case equity cannot otherwise be done.
Notwithstanding the contentment of those defendants who
received and accepted payment of their respective shares in Confederate currency, or notes from their co-defendant Ferrill, under
the authority and direction of their freely-chosen agent, still mv
minl fails to comprehend the process of reasoning by which it
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can be inferred, from such receipt and acceptance, that the rights
of the complainant in this bill are in anywise affected, unless he
was a party to the transaction, or the tribunal which rendered
the judgment had judicial cognisance of the cause.
This court, in WVilliamson v. Riciardson, April Term 1867,
and the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia, in -Deanv. Hfarvey, July 1867 ; and the same court,
in Bailey, Trustee, v. .lilner, 7 Am. Law Reg. 371, s. c. 2
Bleckley R. 330 (35th Ga.), ruled, that where parties, inhabitants
of this state, had, during the rebellion, sold or otherwise disposed
of their property for Confederate notes, and accepted them in
payment or exchange for it ;-where such transaction was fully
executed, and free from fraud, covin, misrepresentation, and undue influence,-the United States Courts for the state of Georgia
would not, unless otherwise instructed by the Supreme Court of
the nation, lend their aid to disturb or to set aside those acts,
but would suffer them to remain entombed, and leave also the
parties to their repose, where they had voluntarily placed themselves: Tolber v. Armstrong, 4 Wash. 296; Planclie v. letcher,
1 Doug. 551; Bonch v. Lawson, Cas. Temp. llardwicke, Loud.
ed. 85, 89, 184.
The owner of property may dispose of it for what he pleases,
or even give it away. But this court cannot recognise Confederate notes, or, as they are more commonly called, " Confederate
Treasury Notes," as money or other thing of value.
And in Bailey v. Milner, supra, it was said by the court that
these notes "were issued by a pretended government, organized
in the name of certain states, by subjects and citizens of the United
States, and who, at the very time, were in rebellion against their
rightful government, and whose object and design was to ' dismember and destroy it:'" The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635.
Ferrill has made the record of the proceedings of 1863, and
also the deed of conveyance, a part of his answer, and having
adopted this mode of defence, he is bound by it, for he cannot
contradict that which he has pleaded as a record, nor gainsay the
conveyance or the recitals therein, and each shows that he had
notice of the claim of complainant to a moiety of the property:
Bowman v. Taylor, Scott 210; 'au. Jkansselaer v. Kearney, 11
How. 297; Bush v. Ware, 15 Peters 93. And where a party
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has knowledge of the facts, he has notice of the legal consequence
resulting from those facts.
In the argument in behalf of Ferrill, it was said by one of his
counsel, that the Superior Court of Chatham county had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and of all the parties in interest,
and its judgment, even if erroneous, cannot be attacked collaterally; citing and commenting on G+iffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch 9;
1 Pick. 439; 2 Burr. 1009; 2 H. Bla. 415; 1 Kelly 487; 23
Ga. 186.
If the tribunal which entertained the proceedings for partition
really possessed the powers ascribed to it by counsel, then the
authorities quoted are apposite, and its judgment cannot be
assailed collaterally. But if it had not such jurisdiction, then
the judgment, so far at least as the rights of the complainant are
involved (for I am not called on to notice any jurisdictional question which might, under other circumstances, affect those who
applied for partition in 1863), is null and void.
And here the inquiry necessarily arises, had the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the judgment?
The national legal tribunals take judicial notice of the general
enactments of the Congress of the United States, and the duly
promulgated proclamations of the President thereof.
The late civil war being matter of public history-a fact impressed upon the whole country-is likewise judicially known to
the courts. And from this general historical fact, they will also
take judicial notice of particular acts which led to it, or happened
during its continuance, whenever it becomes essential to the ends
of justice to do so.
On the, 19th of April 1861, proclamation of blockade was made
by the President. This, of itself, was conclusive evidence that a
state of war existed: The _Prize Cases, 2 Black 635. Congress,
on the 13th of July, in the same year, passed a law authorizing
the President to interdict all trade and intercourse between the
citizens of the states in rebellion and the rest of the United
States. On the 16th of August following, he proclaimed thu
inhabitants of the revolted states, including Georgia, in insurrection; excepting, however, certain named localities. And on the
2d of April 186.3, he reproclaimed them in insurrection; revoking the previous exceptions, but again making others. No part
of Georgia fell within any of the exceptions. Congress by a joint
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resolution, on the 8th of February 1865, declared that "the inhabitants an'l local authorities" of Georgia and ten other states
"rebelled against the government of the United States, and were
i such condition on the 8th of November 1864 :" 12 Stat. 1262;
257 ; 13 Id. 731 ; 567.
In Bailey, Trustee, v. Milner, sulpra, the court said: "During
tile latter part of the year 1860 and the early part of 1861, South
Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Virginia, and other states, by similar modes, called on the people to send delegates to meet in convention. Accordingly the conventions assembled, and each passed
an ordinance of secession, as it is generally termed, by which cereu ony these conventions severally adventured to withdraw the
states from the Federal Union, and to release the people from
their subjection to the laws of the land, and their allegiance to
the nation. The constitutional state governments were overthrown and superseded by spurious and revolutionary governments. The setting up of a pretended central or general government, styled 'The Confederate States of America,' followed, and
4oon thereafter, open rebellion and war of portentous magnitude
burst upon the nation. The Prize Cases.
"In the seceded states (so-called), the sovereign authority being.
for the time, displaced, consequently there ceased to be, within
any of them, a government under the Constitution of the United
States." Tide 1 Bishop's Crim. Law, 3d ed., § 129; and .Aauran v. Insurance Co., 6 Wall. 1.
In 1863 and 1864, the complainant was in the discharge of his
duties as a surgeon in the national army; and whether he had
knowledge of the pendency of the alleged proceedings for partition, is a matter quite immaterial. He, however, in his bill avers
that he knew nothing of them; but admits that he has some indefinite information that the property was sold and was purchased
by John C. Ferrill, and was paid for in Confederate notes. But.
:uplose notice-actual or constructive-came to him; still, he
c3uhl not be charged with laches, for, had he responded, it would
1
:ax-c been i..o facto a breach of his allegiance to the United
,a.s: Ha(inger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532. And in that case Mr.
-Justice C1,irro..:n, in giving the opinion of the court, said: "War,
when duly declarcd or recognised as ,uch by the war-making
power, imports a prohibition to the subjects or citizens, of all
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commercial intercourse and correspondence with citizens or persons
domiciled in the enemy country."
In a subsequent part of the same opinion, that eminent judge,while remarking on the temporary cessation of common-law and
statutory limitations during war,-used the following language:
"But the exception set up in this case stands upon much more
solid reasons, as the right to sue was suspended by the acts of
the government, for which all the citizens are responsible. Unless the rule be so, then the citizens of a state may pay their
debts by entering into an insurrection or rebellion against the
Government of the Union, if they are able to close the courts,
and to successfully resist the laws, until the bar of the Statute of
Limitations becomes complete, which cannot for a moment be
admitted."
The last quotation forcibly illustrates the maxim, that no one
ought to be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong; a
maxim applicable to the case now before this court; not so much,
however, in a positive, as in a circumstantial sense; yet falling
within the principle, that no one shall entitle himself to enforce
a defence by reason of acts adopted or acquiesced in by him,
after full knowledge of their nature and legal ulterior consequences.
If Mr. Ferrill were a bond fide purchaser, who purchased and
paid his money for the property, confiding in the judgment of a
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, then this court would decline
to take coguisance of this suit,-notwithstanding irregularities in
the original proceedings,-if the tribunal which assumed to entertain them had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the rights
of the complainant in this bill.
ideed, the most that can be said against complainant's title is
that it is not free from doubt, but all the doubt there is concerning it is raised by the sale under a pretended judgment of
partition, and the validity of that sale depends upon the validity
of the judgment.
It is a principle governing all courts of judicature that a judgment of a tribunal which has no jurisdiction of the parties and
subject-matter, is absolutely void, and must be so treated when
the. record is offered in evidence or used for any other purpose:
.Bucanan v. Itteier, 9 East 192; Borden v. Pi.'IIT,
15 Jolrs.
121; LVewd[,jate v. Dai'wy, 1 Ld. Rayn. 742. In tlht case, Sir
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Richard Kewdigate gave a donative to Davy, and afterwards
removed him and put in S. Davy, in the time of James II., cited
Newdigate before the high commissioners, who restored Davy
and made Newdigate pay to him all the arrears he had received.
After the Revolution of 1688, Newdigate brought indebitatus
assumpsit against Davy for money as paid to his use. The court
gave judgment for the plaintiff, because it was money paid in pursuance of a void authority.
My conclusion is, that the proceedings for partition, by the
pretended Superior Court of Chatham county, in 1868 and 1864,
so far as the rights of the complainant are concerned, were utterly
void.
The main question being adjudged adversely to John C. Ferrill, still it seems to be necessary to notice another matter which
was pressed with great earnestness. It was said on the part of
Ferrill that adverse possession is a bar to a proceeding for partition both in equity and at law. "If," said the counsel, "the bill
states an adverse possession, it should be dismissed without prejudice." Citing 2 Barb. Ch. 898; 3 Id. 608; 4 Id. 493; 5 Id.
51; 9 Id. 516; Hoff. 560; 1 Johns. Ch. 111; 9 Cow. 516, 573,
and Richd. Eq. 84. These authorities uphold the doctrine contended for.
In addition to those authorities counsel also relied on the case
of The Bishop of By v. Kenriok, Bunb. R. 822. There the
bill for partition was dismissed, because the title was denied.
Without questioning the law of that decision, it must be deemed
somewhat novel; for by it, every defendant in a suit for partition who chooses to deny title, holds the complainant at his
mercy.
Courts, as eminent for their decisions as those referred to in
argument, have of late progressed beyond this ancient technical
rule of chancery practice. In Howg] et al. v. Goings, 18 Ill. 1.
95, Mr. Justice TRUmIrULL, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the state of Illinois, said: "1There can be no
doubt, however, that a bill in chancery lies for partition, notwithstanding an adverse possession, unless it has been continued rufficiently long to'bar a recovery under the Statute of Limitations,
which is not pretended'in this case." Citing Overton v. IFoodfolhk,
6 Dana 874.
I carefully looked into the bill in the present case, and have
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found no allegation of adverse possession, nor is it set up in the
answer, or proved by the evidence.
It is said that in a bill for partition, the averment of possession is not sufficient, there must be an averment of title: 2 Ath.
882; Amb. 236. And the reason of this rule is plain, for it is
upon the title that courts of equity act; and to render the title
of each complete, they compel the parties, when the several
portions are allotted, to execute conveyances according to the
partition, and the execution of these conveyances draws to them
the possession.
If there is no relaxation of the rule which obtained in the
English Chancery and in the Chancery Courts of several of the
older states of the Union, thei, where a bill is filed for partition,
and an adverse possession is interposed, or where the legal title
is disputed, or suspicious circumstances darken it, it is usual for
the court to make a decretal order arresting the proceedings,
until the parties disputant settle the title in a court of law: 1 V.
& B. 552; 3 Johns. Ch. 303; 4 Id. 276. But in some of the
states, owing in part at least to the peculiar manner in which the
tribunals of justice are there constituted, by the blending of the
offices of chancellor and common-law judge in the same person,
the rigid chancery doctrine has been greatly modified.
In Georgia, for example, these offices-distinguishable, in some
degree, in a judicial sense-are exercised by the same person.
And such, indeed, is likewise the case in this court. See Act of
September 24th 1789, § 11, 1 Stats. 78.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Parkerv. Kane,
22 How. 1, speaking of chancery practice in suits for partition,
said: "In Great Britain a chancellor might have considered this
a case in which to take the opinion of a court of law, or to stay
proceedings in the partition and cross-suits until an action at law
had been tried to determine the legal title: Rochester v. Lee, 1
MoN. & G. 46T; Clapp v. Bronaghan, 9 Cow, 530. But such a
proceeding could not be expected in a state where the powers of
courts of law and equity are exercised by the same persons."
But, in my opinion, this case has not thus far presented any question of fact upon which an issue could be framed for the determination of a jury; the evidence in the cause is unassailed, uncontradicted, and in no way conflicting. John C. Ferrill, the
contesting defendant, stands upon the record of the proceedings
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of 1863 and 1864, and if it be ti'iel it must be done by inspection,
and this is the province of the court.
Partition and account decreed accordingly.

Supreine Court qf PennA.glania.
PITTSBURGH, FORT WAYNE, AND CHICAGO RAILROAD CO. e.
SIIAEFFER ET AL

Mere forbearance by a creditor to tie principal debtor, however prejudicial it
may be to the surety, will not have the effect of discharging him from his liability.
The case of the sureties of a railroad officer, charged with the receipt and di. bursement of money, is within the rule; and the company is not bound to dismi-.
the officer as soon as any default becomes known, and to give notice to the suretiethat they may take measures to secure themselves by proceedings against the prin-

cipal.
Where an officer of a corporation violates his duty, knowledge on the part of
other officers of the corporation of the default, or even connivance in it, does nor
discharge the sureties.

ERnon to the District Court of Allegheny county.
W )g.

Jas. Lowre, for plaintiffs in error.

Aeheson &- Koethen, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SUARswooD, J.-The rule is well settled that mere forbearance
by the creditor to the principal debtor, however prejudicial it may
be to the surety, will not have the effect of discharging him from
his liability: U-zited States v. Simpson, 3 Penna. Rep. 437. That
this is the general principle was admitted by the learned judge in
the court below, but he thought that the sureties of a railroa1
officer, charged with the receipt and disbursement of various sum.w
Of money, forned an exception, and that in such a case it was flit.
duty of the company to dismiss the officer as soon as any dcftuhi
became known, and to give notice to his sureties in order that they
might take measures to secure themselves by proceedings ag1-(mut
the principal.
But no authorities are to be found in the books sustaining ai.y
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such distinction. On the contrary, in regard to the sureties of
the officers of government, whose duties in receiving and disbursing money are of the same varied character, it has been
invariably held that they are not discharged by such indulgence.
The United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, was the case of
a collector of direct taxes and internal duties. "It is admitted,"
said Mr. Justice STORY, "that mere laches, unaccompanied with
fraud, forms no discharge of a contract of this nature between
private individuals. Such is the clear result of the authorities.
Why, then, should a more rigid principle be applied to the government-a principle which is at war with the general indulgence
allowed to its rights, which are ordinarily protected from the bars
arising from length of time and negligence? It is said that the
laws require that settlement'should be made at short and stated
periods; and that the sureties have a right to look to this as their
security. But these provisions of the law are created by the
government for its own security and protection, and to regulate
the conduct of its own officers. They are merely directory to
such officers, and constitute no part of the contract with the surety.
The surety may place confidence in the agents of the government,
and rely on their fidelity in office; but he has the same means of
judgment as the government itself, and the latter does not undertake to guaranty such fidelity."
This principle was reconsidered and reaffirmed in The United
States v. TFanzandt, 11 Wheat. 184, where it was held that the
omission of the proper officer to recall a delinquent paymaster
contrary to the expiess injunction of an Act of Congress, did not
discharge the surety: The Comnmonwealth v. Bricee, 10 Harris
211.
The reasons so clearly stated by Judge STORY in regard to officers of government, apply with equal force to the officers of corporations. Corporations can only act by officers and agents. They
do not guaranty to the sureties of one officer the fidelity of the
others. The rules and regulations whictl they may establish in
regard to periodical returns and payments are for their own security, and not for the benefit of the sureties. The sureties, by
executing the bond, became responsible for the fidelity of their
principal. It is no collateral engagement into which they enter,
dependent on some contingency or condition different from the
engagement of their principal. They become joint ,b!ligors witl
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him in the same bond and with the same condition underwritten.
The fact that there were other unfaithful officers and agents of the
corporation, who knew and connived at his infidelity, ought not
in reason, and does not in law or equity, relieve them from the
responsibility for him. They undertake that he shall be honest,
though all around him are rogues. Were the rule different, by a
conspiracy between the officers of a bank or other moneyed institution, all their sureties might be discharged. It is impossible
that a doctrine leading to such consequences should be sound. In
a suit by a bank against a surety on the cashier's bond, a plea
that the cashier's defalcation was known to and connived at by
the officers of the bank, was held to be no defence: Taylor v.
Banc of Kentucky, 2 J. J. Marsh. 564.
But it is urged that in this case the rules and regulations of the
railway company were expressly made a part of the contract with
the sureties. The condition of the bond in suit was that the said
Charles A. Shaeffer "shall,,with care and diligence, faithfully
discharge the duties devolving upon him as cashier, as required
by the present rules and regulations of said Pittsburgh, Fort
Wayne and Chicago Railway Company (a copy of which he
acknowledged to have received) hereby adopted, and by such
other rules and regulations as said company may hereafter adopt,
and shall promptly obey all orders that may be issued by said
company, or by their duly appointed officers or agents." Even
giving to the words "hereby adopted," which are plainly, however, a mere clerical error for "heretofore adopted," all the force
attributed to them, it.is not easy to see how it helps the sureties.
One of these rules, and the ofie principally relied on by the defendants, was that "they (the cashiers) shall make a monthly
return to the auditor on or before the 10th of each month, in
manner and form prescribed." Shaeffer failed to make such
returns as is alleged. His failure was a breach of the condition
of the bond. It is not provided in the rules.that on his default in
making returns he shall be immediately dismissed and the sureties
notified of his default. Admitting that such a rule would have
been part of the contract, the absence of it leaves the case bare
of any legal or equitable ground of defence. It was clearly not
the duty of the compJany to give notice to the sureties of the
principal's failure to make returns: Orme v. Young, 1 Holt N.
P. 84.
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There was nothing in this case but simple indulgence and forbearance, and that under circumstances which were not such as to
call for any extraordinary diligence. Whatever may have been
the discrepancies between Shaeffer's cash-book and his returns.
the account which is annexed to the plaintiffs' paper-book shows
that the balances due by him according to the ledger, varied from
month to month-f-om May to October 1864--when he was notified of his discharge. In June it was $5270.59 ; but in August
only $2110.83, and in September $3101.83. The balance found
in his hands at the close of his last month (October) was
$13,891.27; showing, by subtracting from it the September
balance, that his default in that month alone was $10,789.44.
This may have been the result of previous defaults brought into
that month's account; but supposing the directors to have had
access to these returns and accounts, and that it was their duty to
scrutinize them, what was there to fasten on them the charge of
negligence, even so far as the company-whose interests, and not
those of Shaeffer's sureties, they were bound to consult-was concerned ? I confess myself unable to discover it.
Judgment reversed, and venirefacias de novo awarded.

Vinited States District Court, Testern Districtof Pennsyjlvania.
IN THE IlATTER OF MICHAEL O'HARA, BANKRUPT.

Compensation of counsel for petitioning creditors in involuntary bankruptcy, is
taxable as part of the costs of the proceedings, and payable out of the fund
realized.
But the principle does not extend to give petitioning creditors a right to contribution from the other creditors in case of failure to realize a sufficient fund to pay
expenses and counsel fees.
COUNSEL for the petitioning creditors presented to the Register
a claim of $1500 for compensation for their services as counsel,
which they asked to have taxed in their favor as costs in the proceedings, to be paid out of the funds in the hands of the assignees.
At the time of presenting said claim, they also made proof that
notice of their intention to do so had been served upon the bankrupt and the assignees. The bankrupt neither appeared in person,
VOL. XVH.-8
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nor was he represented lay counsel. The assignees appeared and
filed a written objection to the allowance of said claim, on the
ground that no provision therefor is made either in the Bankrupt
Act or General Orders; admitting, however, the extent of the services rendered, and the reasonableness of the charge therefor.
Opinion by
SAMUEL HARPER, Register.-A question similar to this one has
been decided in favor of allowing compensation to the petitioning
creditors' counsel by Judge BRYAN, of the United Ntates District
Court for South Carolina: In re Daniel Tilliams, 2 Bankrupt
*Register 28. It is true that the decision in that matter rested on
an analogy drawn from the practi6e in the courts of that state, in
Chancery, in allowing counsel fees on a creditor's bill against the
insolvent estates of deceased persons, yet the learned judge gives
other equitable and just reasons for the allowance.
"There is," said he, "a very cogent reasolli why any single
creditor should feel at liberty to prosecute without the fear of
having his claim swallowed up by the expenses of the suit-even
when successful The act contemplates fraud as the ground of
prosecution in a great variety of forms. Instant action by one
creditor in a precise locality, separated from all other creditors,
and without opportunity of counselling with them, is necessary
for the efficient administration of the law, and the protection of
the whole body of creditors. To wait for time for consultation
would, in numerous instances, be io lose the golden moment, and
let the fraudulent debtor go free."
In that case it was remarked that, "in contemplation of law,
so far as his property is concerned, the bankrupt is dead. He is
no longer entitled to control over it, or the distribution of it. It
is assets in the possession of the court, to be administered by the
agency of an assignee, for the equal benefit of all creditors-not
preferred and protected by liens-and such. lien-creditors secured
in their liens, as in the case of an insolvent deceased's estate."
In the present case, this condition of things exists as the result
of the proceedings instituted, and (after an unusually severe
struggle) successfully prosecuted by the petitioning creditors;
and although the Bankrupt Act and General Orders are silent
upon the subject, I think it is within the equity of the court to
say whether the general creditors shall reap the benefit and share
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in the burdens, or whether they shall be entirely exempt from the
latter, and the expense of preparing the petition and its prosecution to the decree of bankruptcy be thrown upon the petitioning
creditors alone. To say the latter, is to say that the involuntary
feature of the Bankrupt Law is a delusion and a fraud. A decision that casts such a pecuniary burden upon the creditor who
rescues the property of a fraudulent debtor for the benefit of all
his creditors, will virtually amount to the abrogation of the involuntary provisions, for it will deter individual creditors from
instituting proceedings against their debtors, which are almost
sure to involve them in still greater pecuniary loss.
The debt of the petitioning creditors in this matter, as proved
before the Register, amounts t6 $1511.80. If the burden of this
claim should be thrown on them, and the bankrupt's estate should
pay all debts in full, it follows that the petitioning creditors w6uld
realize out of the estate eleven dollars and eighty cents, or considerably less than one per cent., while the other creditors would
realize one hundred per cent.
It is no answer to this position to say that the creditors of a
debtor can consult together before proceedings are instituted, and
agree to equally bear the necessary expenses. I have no knowledge of any bankruptcy matter all the creditors in which could
be got together in time to prevent the accomplishment of the
debtor's purpose. It is difficult to follow the most kinds of property after the possession has passed to others; and the hope of
recovering the value -of such property from those who may have
aided the debtor in his fraudulent trahsactions, affords but little
encouragement for the institution of legal proceedings necessarily
expensive. The suggestion that the creditors may or should consult before filing the petition, and agree to bear the expense jointly,
is, however, a recognition of the equity of this claim. To allow
this claim is merely to say-after the successful prbsecution of the
petitioxi-what the creditors themselves would altbost universally
say before the filing of the petition. And there is more reason
and justice in saying it now, because by the prompt action of the
creditor who first learns of the fraudulent actions of the debtor,
much more of his property is rescued for the benefit of the creditors than would be the case if the proceedings were delayedI until
the creditors could be got together for consultation. The summary
processes of the Bankrupt Law encourage prompt action. Its
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involuntary provisions were intended to be efficient in the punishment of dishonest debtors, and the distribution of their property
among their creditors. That efficiency would- be entirely neutralized if the petitioning creditors, instead of acquiring advantages by their proceedings, are to incur heavy pecuniary burdens.
The analogy in the South Carolina case I have cited, does not,
however, exist in Pennsylvania, but I do not think it necessary
that it should.. I base my opinion on the equitable rule that he
who shares in a benefit should contribute a like share to the expenses incurred in realizing the benefit. The Bankrupt Law is
intended to be an uniform system. If it be just and equitable in
South Carolina to tax the compensation of the counsel for the
petitioning creditor as part of the costs, as I believe it is, it is
just and equitable to do the like in Pennsylvania.
The case -ExpartePlitt, 2 Wall. Jr. 453, is somewhat in point.
One Mathias Aspden died in London, 1824, leaving an immense
personal estate to his "heir at law" or " lawful heir." Litigation
followed to determine who was entitled to the estate, and occupied
the attention of the Federal Courts from 1826 to 1852. Several
of the most eminent counsel in the country were concerned in it;
and the question presented in _E parte Plitt in relation to counsel fees was raised by counsel, who, owing to the complex character of the litigation, were instrumental in securing the fund for
the successful claimants, though in the end they represented conflicting interests.
Judge KANE, in the absence of Judge GIRm, delivered the
opinion of the Circuit Court. I quote as follows:
"Over and above the fees of office, this fund is subject to three
classes of charge "1st. The necessary expenses of ascertaining it, and reducing
it into possession.
"2d. A reasonable compensation for its safe keeping, and the

supervision of its interests.
"3d. The expenses of ascertaining the proper distributees, and
making distribution among them."
In the first class he included the expenses paid by an unsuccessful claimant for a commission to England, and $1000 as compensation for services in securing a large amount of money to the
estate.
In the third class he included the claims for counsel fees, and
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said: "We have no doubt of the power of the court, where a fund
is within its control, as in the case before us, to take care of the
rights of the solicitors who have claims against it, whether for
their costs, technically speaking, or their reasonable counsel fees."
Again: ." Now, it is the familiar rule of courts of equity, where
a suit has been instituted and carried on for the benefit of many,
that all who come in to avail themselves of the decree shall bear
their just proportion of the charges."
The parallel is sufficiently clear to need no application to the
present matter.
Of course this decision would not give to the petitioning
creditors the right to enforce contribution from the other creditors
in case of failure. It is only when success follows his petition,
and there are assets to be distributed, that they can be called on
The petitioning creditor takes these
to share the expense.
chances; and should he fail to obtain a decree of bankruptcy, or
after decree fail to discover assets, he must bear the burden alone.
The only general principle ruled is, that the compensation of
the counsel for the petitioning creditor is taxable as costs in cases
of involuntary bankruptcy. No general rule can be laid down as
to the amount of compensation. That is a subject within the discretion of the court, and cannot be determined by an agreement
between the parties. The practice observed in this case is
approved, and will be a precedent to govern in all like matters.
Opinion of the court by
NhCOANDLESS, J.-As the solution of this question does not
depend upon any statutory provision, and, as a precedent, is
of consequence to the profession and the public, before concurring
with the Register, I have given to the subject mature consideration. I have arrived at the conclusion that his opinion is based
on sound principles, and sustained by sufficient authority. The
fund is- within the control of the court, and it is our province so
to administer it as to do exact justice to all the creditors. We
have judicial knowledge of the professional services rendered by
the able counsel of the petitioning creditors, by whose exertions
the fund has been realized; and, as we consider tho fee charged
reasonable, it is proper that their compensation, as one of the
incidental expenses, should be deducted before distribution.
The decision of the Register is affirmed.

